Leatha M. Berrett v. Howard M. Berrett : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Leatha M. Berrett v. Howard M. Berrett : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Michael F. Olmstead; Attorney for Appellant;
Frank S. Warner; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation





FRANK S • WARNER 
543 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
Attorney for Respondent 
-----..... .... __ ,. ___ _ 
aorl, s.,r.,. c.:;.:.: u; -·-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
LEATHA M. BERRETT, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 16204 
vs. 
HOWARD M. BERRETT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, HONORABLE CALVIN GOULD, DISTRICT JUDGE 
FRANK S . WARNER 
543 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
Attorney for Respondent 
* * * * * * * 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT • 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE EXPRESSLY RESTRICTS 
JURISDICTION TO ACTIONS BETWEEN 
HUSBAND AND WIFE; NO PROVISION IS 
MADE FOR CHILD SUPPORT ACTIONS. 
POINT II 
MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE IN UTAH 
TERMINATED WITH THE ENTRY OF THE 
NEW MEXICO DIVORCE DECREE AND PRIOR 
TO ANY CLAIM ARISING. • • • . • • . 
POINT III 
APPELLANT DID NOT COMMIT ACTS IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH GIVING RISE TO A 
CLAIM FOR NONSUPPORT. 
CONCLUSION . . 
Statutes Cited 
78-27-23 (3), U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953, as amended .. 
78-27-24(6), U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
78-27-25, u.c.A., 1953, as amended 
78-27-26, U.C.A., 1953, as amended 
Texts Cited 
76 ALR3d 708 . . . · · · · 
25 Am Jur 2d Domicile §61. 



















Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Black's Law Dictionary. 10 
Utah Law Review, Volume 1970 .• 4 
Cases Cited 
A.R.B. v. G.L.P., (1973) 180 Colo 434, 
507 P2d 468 . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • 9' 10 
Backora v. Balkin, (1971) 14 Ariz App 569, 
485 P2d 292 • • • • • • . . • • . 
Gentry v. Davis, (1974) Tenn 512 SW2d 4 • 
Inkelas v. Inkelas, (1968) 295 NYS 2d 350 
Neill v. Ridner, (1972) 153 Ind App 149, 
286 NE2d 427 .......•..••..• 
Poindexter v. Willis, (1970) 23 Ohio Mise 199, 
5l Ohio Ops 2d 157, 256 NE2d 254 .•... 
State of Kansas ex rel Carrington v. Shutts, 
( 19 7 5 ) 21 7 Kan 1 7 5 , 53 5 P 2 d 9 8 2 . . • 
State ex rel Nelson v. Nelson, (1974) 298 Minn 438, 
NW2d 140. . • • • . • . . • • • • • • • . . • . • • 
Van Wagenburg v. Van Wagenburg, (1966) 241 Md 154, 
215 A 2d 812, 27 ALR3d 379, cert den 385 US 833, 










Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant filed a motion seeking to set aside a 
1971 judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the ground that the 
court in the 1971 proceeding was without jurisdiction in the 
matter before it. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's motion was argued before the Honorable 
Calvin Gould, District Judge. Judgment in the form of a 
"Memorandum Decision" denying Defendant's motion was granted 
in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
District Court entered in favor of Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Berrett were married in Pleasant View, 
Utah on May 18, 1940. Except for a brief sojourn of approxi-
mately one year in the State of Oregon, they resided in Utah 
as man and wife until the summer of 1947 or 1948 when Mr. 
Berrett moved to the State of New Mexico (R-60). 
In 1948, after having established residency in 
New Mexico, Mr. Berrett filed for divorce in that state 
against Mrs. Berrett. On January 19, 1949, the New Mexico 
court granted Mr. Berrett a divorce decree. The decree pro-
vided in part that Mr. Berrett pay Mrs. Berrett as and for 
the support of the two minor children the sum of $100.00 
per month (R-6). 
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The parties herein are in dispute as to the exact 
time and under what circumstances that Mr. Berrett moved to 
New Mexico, but the court below was of the opinion that 
these factual disputes were immaterial (R-60). 
In any event, two children had been born as issue 
of the marriage, namely, Caroline Sally Berrett born in 1943 
and David James Berrett born in 1948. Both children were 
born in Weber County, Utah, and Mrs. Berrett and the children 
continued to reside in Utah after Mr. Berrett's departure 
until her death in 1973. Mr. Berrett resided in New Mexico 
for a period of time after the divorce, then California, 
and presently resides in Phoenix, Arizona. From and after 
his move from Utah to New Mexico, Mr. Berrett never again 
resided in the State of Utah (R-60). 
On October 29, 1971, Mrs. Berrett filed a petition 
in the District Court of Weber County, Utah, requesting the 
District Court to enforce the New Mexico divorce decree insofar 
as it pertained to claimed child support in arrears. Mr. 
Berrett was personally served with a copy of said petition 
in Maricopa County, Arizona, on November 16, 1971. Juris-
diction over Mr. Berrett, according to the petition, was 
claimed to be valid under the Utah longarm statute, §78-27-24, 
§78-27-25, and §78-27-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Mr. Berrett failed to plead, appear or otherwise respond to 
this petition and on December 28, 1971, a default judgment was 
granted Mrs. Berrett against Mr. Berrett for child support in 
-2-
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arrears in the sum of $19,625.00 (R-61). 
In 1973, Mrs. Berrett died intestate leavinq aa ber 
sole heirs at law her two children, Caroline and David. ~ 
sole asset in her estate is the 1971 judgment against Defendant. 
Mrs. Berrett's heirs are seeking enforcement of the 1971 
judgment by levying against a Utah inheritance left to Mr. 
Berrett by his deceased parents (R-61) and as indicated, Mr. 
Berrett is seeking to have the judgment voided (R-60). 
Upon these facts, the court below found that in 
the 1971 proceeding, it did have jurisdiction over the matter 
before it and that its jurisdiction was exercised in a manner 
sufficient to satisfy basic due process (R-60, 61, 62). 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE EXPRESSLY RESTRICTS JURISDICTION 
TO ACTIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; NO 
PROVISION IS MADE FOR CHILD SUPPORT ACTIONS 
Utah's longarm statute, insofar as it might be 
pertinent to the facts of this case, provides as follows: 
78-27-24 Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts 
submitting person to Jurisd1ct1on - Any person, 
notwithstanding section 16-10-102, whether or 
not a citizen or resident of this state, who 
in person or through an agent does any of the 
following enumerated acts, submits himself, 
and if an individual, his personal representa-
tive, to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
this state as to any claim arising from:. 
(6) With respect to actions of divorce.and . 
separate maintenance, the maintenance ~n th1s 
state of matrimonial domicile at the t1me the 
claim arose or the commission in this state 
of the act giving rise to the claim. 
Appellant believes that this Court must first 
address itself to the issue as to whether or not Utah's 
-3-
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longarm statute restricts jurisdiction to actions between 
husband and wife or whether it also allows for matters 
incidental to separation or divorce such as claims for child 
support. 
There is an extensive Law Review article on Utah's 
longarm statute in Utah Law Review, Volume 1970 commencing at 
Page 222 entitled "In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded: Utah's 
Longarm Statute." Beginning at Page 241 of the Note, the 
writers discuss subsection {6) of Section 24. 
The writers analyze that the primary benefit of 
subsection {6) is to permit a wife residing in this state to 
sue her deserting husband for divorce or separate maintenance 
and obtain an enforceable order for support without being 
required to make service in Utah. The writers go on to note 
that the "act" committed in Utah must be a type of act giving 
rise to a claim for divorce or separate maintenance and does 
not provide for jurisdiction in claims for annulment or in 
claims for the custody or support of children. Utah Law 
Review 1970, Pages 242-245. A strict application of the 
statute would therefore preclude jurisdiction of the court 
under subsection (6). 
There are a number of jurisdictions where longarm 
statutes expressly include not only acts giving rise to 
divorce or separation, but also to claims involving actions 
for annulment or to claims incidental to divorce such as 
custody and support of children. See 76 ALR3d 708 titled 
-4-
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"Long arm Statutes: Obtaining Jurisdiction over llonreaiA!eln, 
Parents in Filiation or Support Proceedings.• AppellaDt 
submits that had the legislature intended to include c~ 
in addition to those expressly included in the statute, it 
would have been a simple matter to do so and that UDder the 
circumstances, this Court should strictly interpret tbe 
language of the statute in its application to the facta of 
this case. The statute in question is limited to acta giving 
rise to claims for divorce or separate maintenance and 
jurisdiction is not extended to claims for nonsupport as in 
the case before this Court. 
POINT II 
MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE IN UTAH TERMINATED 
WITH THE ENTRY OF THE NEW MEXICO DIVORCE 
DECREE AND PRIOR TO ANY CLAIM ARISING 
As indicated in Point I, Utah's longarm statute, 
insofar as it is pertinent to the facts of this case, provides 
for jurisdiction over nonresidents "with respect to actions 
of divorce and separate maintenance, the maintenance in this 
state of matrimonial domicile at the time the claim arose or 
the commission in this state of the act giving rise to the 
claim" see 78-27-24(6), u.c.A., 1953, as amended. 
It is difficult to determine whether in 1971 the 
Court below found jurisdiction because it found "maintenance 
in this state of a matrimonial domicile at the time the claim 
arose," or because it found that Mr. Berrett had committed in 
this state some type of act or acts giving Mrs. Berrett a 
claim for action, or for both reasons. This is because the 
-5-
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file, insofar as it refers to the 1971 proceedings, is 
devoid of any transcript, findings of fact, or conclusions of 
law in support of the decision of the Court at that time 
(R-1 through R-8). 
It appears clear, however, that the Court below 
in the instant proceedings here appealed from found jurisdictioo 
not because of acts committed in Utah by Mr. Berrett giving 
rise to a claim by Mrs. Berrett, but rather because matrimonial 
domicile continued in the State of Utah even though Mr. Berrett 
had left the state sometime prior to the entry of the New 
Mexico divorce decree (R-61, 62). 
The Court below apparently found that the so-called 
"minimal contacts" test for the statute had been met by the 
existence at one time of a matrimonial domicile in the State 
of Utah and that Mr. Berrett's duties and obligations, 
including that of support for his children, were thereby 
fixed and continued despite the fact that he thereafter 
established residency elsewhere (R-61, 62). 
The reasoning of the Court below may have some merit 
had Mrs. Berrett's 1971 petition been based on some common law 
duty of support arising out of Mr. Berrett's having fathered 
these children with or without the benefit of wedlock. How-
ever, Plaintiff's 1971 petition was not based upon the fore-
going concept or theory, but was based on a specific order 
for support arising out of the New Mexico divorce decree 
(R-1, 2). With the entry of that decree, matrimonial domicile 
-6-
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terminated for both Mr. and Mrs. Berrett and each party then 
assumed domicile independently of the other, Mr. Berrett by 
continuing to reside in the State of.New Mexico and Mrs. 
Berrett by continuing to reside in the State of Utah. It is 
important to note that Mrs. Berrett's domicile in Utah from 
and after the entry of the New Mexico decree of divorce was 
in no way based upon matrimony, but on individual and 
independent selection. See 25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 561. 
Clearly and chronologically, Mrs. Berrett's claim as outlined 
in her 1971 petition arose after the severance of matrimonial 
domicile in the State of Utah and the statute, insofar as it 
provides for "maintenance in this state of a matrimonial 
domicile at the time the claim arose," was not present. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT DID NOT COMMIT ACTS IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH GIVING RISE TO A CLAIM FOR NONSUPPORT 
As noted previously, the longarrn statute provides 
for jurisdiction with respect to claims not only where there 
is matrimonial domicile at the time the claim arises, but also 
in cases where an individual commits in this state an act or 
acts giving rise to a claim for divorce or separate maintenance 
(or claims incidental thereto if this Court should so hold). 
Again reference is made to the annotation found in 
76 ALR3d 708 in consideration of the issues presented under 
this point. A careful reading of the annotation and the cases 
cited therein would indicate that the courts in each fact 
situation were looking at one or more of three factors, namely: 
-7-
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1. Were there certain "minimal contacts" between 
the father and the forum state? 
2. What interests does the forum state have in 
the controversy that is the subject of the litigation? 
3. May a nonact such as failure to pay child support 
constitute a "tort" within the meaning of the statute? 
Thus in cases involving paternity, certain juris-
dictions found merely fathering a child in the forum state 
constituted "minimal contacts." Backora v. Balkin (1971) 
14 Ariz App 569, 485 P2d 292; Neill v. Ridner (1972) 153 Ind 
App 149, 286 NE2d 427. 
It is to be noted that the above cases are distin-
guishable from the case at hand because the issue in them 
obviously concerned an act (i.e., fathering a child) in the 
forum state, whereas in our case, the claim in the 1971 
petition failed to allege any acts by Appellant in Utah (R-1, 2). 
Mrs. Berrett predicated her 1971 petition for 
judgment for nonsupport expressly upon the New Mexico divorce 
decree entered January 19, 1949. The time of the decree is 
critical because the file is devoid of any facts or circumstances 
that could be construed as "acts" or "minimal contacts" by 
Appellant within the State of Utah from and after the entry 
of the decree. All contacts of Appellant prior to that time, 
namely, (1) marriage in Utah, (2) living in Utah in matrimony, 
and ( 3) fathering children in Utah, necessarily become immateri;: 
because they precede the document and event upon which Mrs. 
-8-
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Berrett predicated her claim for relief. 
Next the cases cited above, namely, Back9ca aa4 ~' 
and others have discussed the interests of the forua ·~-- in 
the subject of the litigation. See also Poindexter v. Wiliif 
(1970) 23 Ohio Mise 199, 51 Ohio Ops 2d 157, 256 HB2d 254r 
Van Wagenburg v. Van Wagenburg (1966) 241 Md 154, 215 A 2d 112, 
27 ALR3d 379, cert den 385 US 833, 17 LEd 2d 68, 87 S Ct 73. 
Emphasis is made in these cases upon the fact that the minor 
children involved may become wards of the forum state and tbat 
the state therefore has a direct financial interest in the 
litigation. 
It seems as though these cases in discussing the 
presence of the minor children within the forum state ignore 
the "in personam" issue before them and assume a type of 
"in rem" jurisdiction because of the presence of the minor 
children they are seeking to protect. It must be pointed 
out that conversely to the foregoing illustrations, the 1971 
petition by Mrs. Berrett did not in the least involve facts 
that would give the Court this type of "in rem" interest in 
the litigation. In 1971, the State of Utah had no past, 
present, or future interest in the support of Mrs. Berrett's 
children who by that time had attained their adulthood. 
In addition, the reasoning of Poindexter has been 
criticized and not followed in a number of other jurisdictions, 
1 V. G.L.P. (1973) 180 Colo 434, 507 P2d 468; n arne y , ::A:..:.· .:.:R:..:.· .:::B:..:.· __::._:_.:=..;...=...:...:....:.. 
State of Kansas ex rel Carrington v. Shutts (1975) 217 Kan 
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Finally, some of the cases found in the annotation 
have determined that the failure to support a child constitutes 
a "tort" ·Within the meaning of their longarrn statute. 
Poindexter, supra; see also State ex rel Nelson v. Nelson 
(1974) 298 Minn 438, 216 NW2d 140; Gentry v. Davis (1974) 
Tenn 512 SW2d 4. 
Respondent could argue that the alleged failure 
to pay support under the divorce decree constitutes the 
commission by Appellant of a "tort" under subsection (3) 
of the statute which provides for longarrn jurisdiction over 
a nonresident who causes tortious injury within the State 
of Utah. See §78-27-23(3), U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
Black defines "tortious" as "of the nature of a 
tort." "Tort" is defined as "a private or civil wrong or 
injury. A wrong independent of contract." See Black's 
Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition (1968), Pages 1660-
1661. In Poindexter, Nelson and Gentry, the courts were 
faced with an alleged existing duty of support between a 
putative father and minor children then living in the forum 
state. They found an existing duty of support from father 
to child that if breached, would cause resulting damage or 
injury to the child. In this sense, Appellant can follow 
the reasoning of those cases where those facts then existed, 
although again this reasoning is criticized and not followed 
in ~·, Carrington and Inkelas. 
In 1971, Mr. Berrett owed no duty of support to 
-10-
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the Berrett children (R-1, 2). The Order to Show cau .. 
served on Mr. Berrett required that he appear and show 
cause why the New Mexico decree "should not be enforced 1D 
the State of Utah" and "why you should not be found an4 bel4 
in contempt of Court .•• " (R-3). Does the petition or tbe 
directive of the Court sound in tort in the sense defiDed ~ 
Black? Nor do the facts as they existed in 1971 cont.-plate 
the commission of a tort by Appellant as contemplated by the 
statute. 
In summary, it becomes clear that Mr. Berrett 
d~d not commit any acts in the State of Utah nor were there 
any significant contacts with the State of Utah at the 
critical point in time, namely, from and after January 19, 
1949. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time Mrs. Berrett's alleged cause of action 
arose, matrimonial domicile in this state was nonexistent. 
Nor did Mr. Berrett commit acts in this state satisfying 
the "minimum contacts" requirements contemplated by the 
longarm statute. The judgment of the Court below should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Attorney for Appellant 
2650 washington Boulevard 
Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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